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SITUATION

I

BELLIGERENT AND NEUTRAL RIGHTS IN
REGARD TO AIRCRAFT

#

States X and Y are at war. Other states are
neutral. All states concerned are parties to the
conventions relating to the conduct of aircraft as
ratified by the Pan-American Conferences, and
respect the generally accepted principles of
i11ternational law.
(a) It is know11 that an aircraft, B-17, registered in state B, has carried to state X articles of
the nature of contraband.
(b) It is known that an aircraft, C-12, registered in state 0, has flown to a port 0 in state X
above the line of vessels, submarines and aircraft,
maintaini11g a blockade of port 0.
(c) It is known that an aircraft, D-20, registered in stateD, has carried i11 the regular air mail
from port 0 to port N, an unblockaded port of
state X, military messages, funds, and some light
but essential military materials.
(d) It is known that an aircraft, E-30, registered in state E, has carried essential military materials to Forta, a town in state F near the frontier
of state X, and that some of these materials were
immediately shipped to state X.
(e) It is known that an aircraft, G-40, registered in state G, has under special charter carried
General Xano of the .Army of X from a port in
state G to the 1nilitary headquarters of state X.
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These aircraft, severally, later, \vhe11 above the
high sea, are within a11 easy range of the guns of
the Y -2, a Inilitary aircraft i11 state Y.
What 111ay the Y -2 la,vfully do in each case~
SOLUTION

I11 each insta11ce the Y -2 n1ay la,vfully visit and
search the neutral aircraft.
(a) The B.-17 should be released.
(b) If the Y -2 is a n1ember of the blockading
squadron and if it 111eets the C-12 \vhile the latter
is engaged on the return voyage, the C-12 should be
seized and held for prize court adjudication. If
the Y-2 encounters the C-12 after the latter has
completed the round trip journey, the C-12 should
be released. If the Y -2 is not a mernber of the
blockading squadron but meets the C-12 \vhile the
latter is on the return trip, the C-12 may be seized
and held for prize court adju'dication.
(c) Tl1e D-20 shol1ld be released.
(d) The E-30 shollld be released.
(e) If the G-40 is no longer under special charter a11d if it has completed the jour11ey for \Vhich
it \vas hired, it should be released.
NOTES

A.ir law 'i?~ gene1Yll.-A.t the present tin1e there
are no binding conventional international law rules
regulating the conduct of airplanes in war time.
The 11eed for effective la\v on this subject is great
indeed, and it is to be hoped that the situation can
be remedied in the near future. The use of airplanes i11 the Spanish Civil conflict and in the SinoJapanese struggle has brought the law's gaps very
· vividly to public atte11tion. Also the constant
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111enace and threat of air bombardment in a future
\Var emphasizes the necessity for the development
of international air la\v. Strictly speaking, therefore, since no binding rules exist, the Y -2 might
technically be permitted to do anything it pleased
with the assorted neutral craft herein involved.
The \Vord "lawfully'' \Vill be construed, however,
as implying the existence of legal pri11ciples, and
the solutions \Vill be reached in part by carrying
#over analogies from land and marine warfare into
the air. As will be indicated later, the air weapon
is sui ge1~eris in many respects, so that analogies
are not always applicable, btlt they are none the
less extremely useful in the formulation of the
required rules.
Naval War College d-isc~tss-ions.-The subject of
air law has been considered previously in Naval
vVar College situations, notably, in 1928, 1935, and
1936. As was stated in the 1936 situation:
The introduction of aircraft as a means of warfare greatly
1nodified the conduct of 'var upon the earth surface, on the
"~ater as 'vell as on land. The earlier rules for warfare 'vere
concerned with surface combat. These rules could not in
every instance be extended by analogy to aerial ·warfare, because the forms of warfare "~ere not analogous. There was
an atteinpt on the part of son1e 'vriters to extend the three
Inile maritime jurisdiction doctrine to the superjacent air.
In this attempt the early recognition of the fact that the
law· of gravity did not act horizontally and vertically in
the saine manner, destroyed the analogy. Differences in
speed and in other respects introduced other complications
in atteinpts to extend maritin1e and land rules to the air.
Aircraft "·ere coining n1ore and more to be used in war;
therefore, rules had to be devised. The 'Vorld War experiences and probleins contributed valuable basal data for the
deterinination of the nature of possible regulation of use of
aircraft. The equipment of aircraft with radio introduced
other problems. (International I.Ja 'v Situations, 1936, p. 39.)
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Can 7egal' restraints on air 1varjare be ?na.de ~
rJ,he feeling has beell prevalent in some quarters
that efforts to Ctlrb the tlse of aircraft in \var are
doon1ed to. failure because this ne'v \veapon is so
po\verftll that 110 belligerent \VOllld be \Villing to
restrict the en11)loyine11t of this military ar1n. The
deYastation and destruction \vhich airplanes may·
bring about, so the argument l'Uils, \vill be so effect ive in bri11ging the oppo11ent to terms that hereafter the sanctions for restraint 'vill no longer be
operative. Further, ·"the. possibilities of· "totalitariail'' \vars bet,veeil rival ideological grollps
n1akes it appear to some people that ctlrbs \Vould
be of 110 value. This hypothesis that ruthless11ess
"ill "pay" a11d that legal restrictio11s \vill be footless, deserves examination.
The arguments in favor of putti11g restrai11ts 011
the use of aircraft may be summed tlp as follo\vs:
1. In the past, devastation has al,vays been illegal
\vhen it has not been of n1ilitary advantage. It l1as
11ot profited a belligerent to destroy 1nore life and
1)roperty than he 11eeds for the attainment of l1is
1nilitary objective, namely, the subjection of the
enemy. If a belligerent \Vins a verdict over a still
prosperous foe, he is the richer and derives more
be11efit than if he had defeated a starved and
exhausted enemy.
There 1nust be some reasonably close connection bet,veen
the destruction of property and the overcoming of the
enemy's ar1ny. (~fanual, Rules of Land "\Varfare, 1914,
Section 334.)
The object of 'var in the 1nilitary sense is to procure the
co1nplete submission of the enemy at the earliest possible
period w·ith the least possible expenditure of men and money.
(\,Tilson and Tucker, International r~aw, 9th Edition, p. 250.)

AIR \VAR SANCTIOXS

2. It is also always bee11 held that it is to the

adva11tage of all belligerents not to lapse i11to
barbarism.
The advantage of having and of n1aintaining a regime
under w·hich the more gross and calamitous varieties of
Schrecklichkeit are banned, will be apparent to the man on
the street-who ·will be himself affected-and, one hopes,
even to the 1nost 1nilitarist governinents. ( J. M. Spaight~
Airpower and War Rights, Second Edition, 1933, p. 29.)

3. There has tlsually been also a certain amount

of 11atural chivalry and humanitarianisn1 in \VaTfare. These have tlnderlain ma11y of the \Var
rules, the assumptio11 being that there are certain
things which human beings will not do to one. another even in the heat of strife .
...~irships frequently returned :from their expeditions 'vith
their :full complement o:f bo1nbs, because they haYe not been
able to make out certain targets ''ith sufficient accuracy. It
"-ould have been easy enough :for the1n before returning to
get rid o:f their bon1bs and drop them on any place oYer
which they happened to fly, i:f they w·anted to kill harmless
citizens. ( Spaight, op. cit., p. 14.)

4. Another sanction for the laws of \Var has been
the fear of retaliation. Restraint upon a belligerent has thus often been in1posed by a dread of
reprisals. Though these 'latter have never bee11
successfully regulated by lavv, they have operated
as a deterrent to lawless action.
5. In the case of air warfare it has often bee11
contended that indiscri111inate bo1nbing only stiffellS the resistance of the e11e111y popula tio11,
a11d that rt1thless11ess, tl1erefore, carries \Vith it its
o\vn sa11ction. If this \Vere so universally there
\vould be no military advantage i11 \Vholesale air
bo111bardn1e11t of Cl'O\vded cities and innocent
l)O})Ula tions.
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~rhe

sanctions for the la\vs of \Yar have thus
rested upo11 com1non sense and practical considerations. Rules a11d conve11tions \vhich stray far
fron1 the realities of belligerent strife become
fruitless 1noral injunctions, but ethics and 111ilitary
necessities frequently con1bine, as abo·ve sho\vn,
i11to imposing, se11sible restraints u p011 a belligerent.
A ·i r 1va1·fare and the sanct-ions of the la1vs of 1var.
-~t\..s previollsly indicated, the belief is current
an1ong various groups that the custo111ary sanctions
do not and ca11110t operate \vhere air co111bat is concerned. These argun1ents 1nay be summarized as
follO\VS:
1. Contrary to the thesis that rutllless-bonlbardnlei1t merely increases a natio11 's \Vill to resist, is
the vie\V that devastation may in ti1ne \Veake11 the
morale of a belligerent state. The bombardments
of Barcelona of March 1938, and the use of gas
from the air by the Italians in Ethiopia are cited
as exa1nples of the \vay in \Vl1ich \Var from the sky
ca11 undermine tl1e fighting spirit. The nerve-racking te11sion, the sleepless nights, the perpetual sense
of insecurity, the nightmare of sudden death in
one's O\Vn home or in those of friends and relatives,
act as corrosives upon the iron vvill and tend to
n1ake a people \VOllder \Vhether the ideals for \Vhicl1
they think they are figl1ting are \Vorth this holocaust and carnage.
It is not altogether true that the bon1bing of England had
no In oral effect for by n1oral effect is not 1neant only a sudden~ craven desire to surrender; and secondly, that air attacks on the large centers of populations \vere 1nerely side
·s ho"·s in 1915-18, \vhereas in the next \Yar they \viii be a
pri1nary operation * : : *. Xo doubt on the \vhole, London took the air raids \vith dignity and co1nposure, but no
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one 'vho is acquainted 'vith the facts can adn1it that the
people who left London to crowd into :Niaidenhead, Manchester, Brighton, and other safer towns, 'vere exclusively
"Se,vs and Aliens." (Spaight, op. cit., pp. 8 and 9.)

2. 011 the grounds of military necessity it is denied by many that there is no military advantage
in bon1bing food s11pplies, con1munication centers,
crops and civilia11 homes. This is to say that the
line between military requirements and useless
#civilian da111age can no longer be drawn. Wide
scale air operations dealing death indiscriminately,
and paralyzing normal civilian operations, may
have a definite military objective, in that the war
n1ay be shortened. This line of reasoning is allied
to the discussion above about civilian 1norale because 'vhatever tends to cause civilian resistance
to crumble rnay be regarded as having a military
objective. This of course is broadening the concept of military necessity in a fasl1i011 seldom previously tolerated. The effectiveness of the airplane, however, is so great and its potentialities
for dealing deadly blows are so vast that it is said
that air bombardments cannot be compared to the
''unnecessary'' da111age committed by la11d and sea
forces 'vhere the destruction is relatively so i11sig11ificant that it really do,es not "pay" and only
causes useless loss llnconnected witl1 any geillline
'veake11ing of morale and resista11ce.
If * : : * so1ne but not an excessive loss of life can be
sho,vn to be involved in operations 'vhich 'vill enorn1ously
abbreviate the periods of 'vars and 'vill reduce to a comparatively trivial total the casualty lists and the huge but incalculable sum of indirect losses consequent upon hostilities, it
could be argued that hun1anity 'vill gain and not lose fron1
the recognition of the legiti1nacy of the ne'v method.
(Spaight, op. cit., p. 81.)
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3. As for chivalry, it is said that 'vhe11 ideologies
clash the usual bu1nai1itaria11 feelings vvill be subJnergecl. Ho,Y, runs the query, ca11 a Fascist a11d a
Co1nmunist be expected to deal lil\:e gentlemen 'vith
011e a11other \Vhe11 the only obligation \Vhich they
feel is that of exterminating 011e another. .As
Spaight says ''Conde111natio11 or approval of any
given bombardn1ent \Viii tend to vary "rith the ideological bias of the con11neutator upon it". (The
19th Ce11tnry, Sept. 1938. Vol. 124, No. 739.)
4. Whe11 it comes to retaliatio11 as a sanction,
those opposi11g the attempt to regulate air \Varfare
declare that if a11 air-minded belligere11t is quick
enough and ruthless enough, he can give the enemy
such a blow at the outset that there will be no possibility for retaliatio11. Reprisals are a sanction
only if the other side has the physical strength to
threater1 the1n. Therefore, a belligerent \vhich has
overwhelming supre1nacy i11 the air, a11d which can
lay waste his opponent, 11eed fear 110 retaliation and
can hope for a speedy victory. These are the
thoughts a11d dreams of those proposing the ''War
of Terror" which has the support of some strategists in son1e countries.
Despite the cogency of son1e of these argume11ts,
it is still \Vorth atten1pting to elaborate some rules.
The unrestricted \Var of the skies has 1nany devotees and tl1eir })lea fo1· a relaxation of the custoinary restraints has a certai11 plausibility, but it
cannot be presu1ned \vithout n1ore experience and
evidence that air \varfare will be exempt fron1 the
sanctions \vhich land and sea con1batants have
al,vays encollntered. To date, the existence of
1·ules has been found to be of advantage. Upo11
that basis the effort to forn1ulate a practical code
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of the air should go foT\vard, the drafters always
bearing in mind the special nature of aircraft and
the need for practical considerations. Eve11 if a
code between belligerents seems of dubious efficacy,
there would be an obvious linprovement in the relatioilS betwee11 belligerents and neutrals if law on
this topic \vere developed. A belligerent may well
fear 1~eutral retaliation, if not that of his oppo11ent,
• a11d there "rould be a gain to all states througl1 the
making of effective regulatio11s.
Actual and projected conventions a1~d rules [o1·
the a,i r.-The first rule concerning air \Varfare was
drafted at the First Hague Peace Co11ference in
1899. That convention prohibited the discharge
of l)rojectiles fro1n bailoo11S for a period of 5 years.
Before the convening of the second Hague co11ference in 1907, 1nany states sa\v son1e of the possibilities of air \Varfare, and were therefore llnwilling to renew their adherence to the 1899 co11vention. The only other pre-V\7ar regulation of air
con1bat is found i11 Article 25 of Co11vention IV,
Respecting the La\vs and Customs of War on Land,
\Vhich stipulated that '''T he attack or bombardn1ent, by 1chatever 1neans, of towns, villages, habitations, or buildings \Yhich are not defe11ded, is prohibited." Much dispute has raged as to \Vhether
this article, bei11g a part of a land con·vention,
covers the air, though the words "whatever 1neans"
\VOUld seen1 to be llather con1prehensive. rrhe debate as to the i11tent of this regulation seems rather
futile in a11y event, because only undefe11ded
places are iiill11Ulle, a11d it is never hard for belligere11ts to discover that a particular place \vhich
they \Vish to bon1bard is actually '' defe11ded.''
1G73~:1-40-~
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'J'his san1e 1)roblen1 as to what is defended and
\Yhat is not, arose in com1ectioi1 with Article I of
Hague Conve11tio11 IX concer11ing naval boinbardJnent. During the "rorld ,yar, tl1erefore, there
\Vas little effective legal regulatio11 of air \Varfare
\vhich increased in Inagnitude and importa11ce so
tre1nendously at that time.
There was uncertainty before 1914 also as to
jurisdiction over the air, son1e contending that the
air above a certain height should be free, each
subjace11t state havi11g an air belt con1parable to
1nargi11al seas. The regulations of neutrals during the \Var and the experiences of that conflict
gave impetus to the for1nulatio11 of the pres~nt
rule that each subjacent state has con1plete jurisdiction over all the air space above it. The absurdity of a11 air belt in the light of the la\vs of physics
\Vhicl1 decree that a11 object dropped fron1 a great
height will hit harder than a11 object dropped
11carer the ground soo11 became n1anifest and post\Var conventions and drafts have recognized each
state's jurisdiction up to the heavens.
Post-u;ar conve1~tions and tJroposals.-A number of treaties have bee11 made since the \Var which
lay do\Yll rules for aircraft in peace ti1ne. The first
of these \vas the Conventio11 on the Regulation
of Aerial Navigation of 1919 \Yhich states in Article I:
T'he high contracting parties recognize that eYery pow·er
has co1nplete and exclusiYe soYereignty oYer the air space
n.hoYe its territory.

Another note\Yortby convention \vas that m.ade
in Habana in 1928 on Co111111ercial Aviation, and
though its provisions are not designed for \Var, the
follo,ving articles are releva11t to this discussion:
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ARTICLE 3. The follo,ving shall be deen1ed to be state air
craft:
(a) lVlilitary and Naval aircraft.
(b) Aircraft exclusively e1nployed in state service, such
as posts, custon1s, police.
Every other aircraft shall be dee1ned to be a private aircraft.
All state aircraft other than 1nilitary, naval, customs, and
police aircraft shall be treated as private aircraft and as
such shall be subject to all the provisions of the present
.- convention.

Follovving the W ashi11gto11 Limitation of Arms
Conference of 1922 a co1nmission of jurists met at
The Hague and drafted .a convention on air 'varfare. In this conventio11 the criterion of defended
or undefended was abandoned, and air bombardment was regulated i11 tern1s of objectives. The
framers of these rules definitely prohibited indiscriminate bombardment, a11d endeavored to furnish
a precise definition of the objectives which alone
may be attacked. The following articles of this
draft are the ones most relevant to this discussion:
ARTICLE 6. ( 1) The transmission by radio by a vessel or
an aircraft, whether enemy or neutral, 'vhen on or over the
high seas of military intelligence for the immediate use of
a belligerent is to be deen1ecl a hostile act and 'vill render
the vessel or aircraft liable to be fired upon.
(2) A neutral vessel or neutral aircraft 'vhich transmits
"·hen on or over the high seas information destined for a
belligerent concerning military operations or military forces
shall be liable to capture. The Prize Court may conde1nn
the vessel or aircraft if it considers that the circumstances
justify condemnation.
(3) Liability to capture of a neutral vessel or aircraft on
account of the acts referred to in paragraphs ( 1) and ( 2)
is not extinguished by the conclusion of the voyage or flight
on 'vhich the vessel or aircraft 'vas engaged at the time,
but shall subsist for a period of one year after the act con1plained of.
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30. In case a belligerent co1nn1anding officer considers that the presence of aircraft is likely to prejudice
the success of the operations in which he is engaged at the
n1o1nent, he 1nay prohi'Qit the passing of neutral aircraft
in the in11nediate vicinity of his forces or 1nay oblige the1n
to follo'v a particular route. A neutral aircraft 'vhich does
not confor1n to such directions, of 'vhich he has had notice
issued by the belligerent con11nanding officer, 1nay be fired
upon .
.A.~TICLE 37. :\Ie1nbers of the cre'v of a neutral aircraft
"·hich has been detained by a belligerent shall be released
unconditionally, if they are neutral nationals and not in
the service of the ene1ny. If they are enemy nationals or
in the service of the enen1y, they 1nay be made prisoners of
"·ar.
Passengers are entitled to be released unless they are in
the service of the enerny or are enemy nationals fit for military service, in 'vhich cases they 1nay be made prisoners of
"·ar.
Release 1nay in any case be delayed if the 1nilitary interests of the belligerent so require.
The belligerent 1nay hold as prisoners of w·ar any In emher of the crew or any passenger w· hose service in a flight
at the close of which he has been captured has been of
special and active assistance to the enemy.
ARTICLE 49. Private aircraft are liable to visit and search
and to capture by belligerent military aircraft .
.A.RTICLE 50. Belligerent 1nilitary aircraft have the right
to order public non-n1ilitary and private aircraft to alight
in or proceed for visit and search to a suitable locality reasonably accessible.
Refusal, after warning, to obey such orders to alight or
to proceed to such a locality for exan1ination expo~es an airera ft to the risk of being fired upon .
..A.RTICLE 53 ......<\.. neutral private aircraft is liable to capture
if it( a) Resists the legiti1nate exercise of belligerent rights.
(b) Violates a prohibition of 'vhich it has had notice issued
by a belligerent co1nmancling officer under article 30.
(c) I s engaged in unneutral service.
.A.RTICLE
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(d) Is armed in time of war 'vhen outside the jurisdiction
·of its own country.
(e) Has no external marks or uses false n1arks.
(f) Has no papers or insufficient or irregular papers.
(g) Is manifestly out of the line between the point of
departure and the point of destination indicated in its papers
and after such enquiries as the belligerent may deen1 necessary, no good cause is shown for the deYiation. The aircraft,
together with its cre'v and passengers, if any, n1ay be detained
by the belligerent, pending such enquiries.
(h) Carries, or itself constitutes, contraband of war.
( i) Is engaged in breach of a blockade duly established and
-effectively maintained.
( k) Has been transferred from belligerent to neutral nationality at a date and in circumstances indicating an intention of evading the consequences to which an ene1ny aircraft,
as such, is exposed.
Provided, That in each case (except ( lc) ) the ground for
·capture shall be an act carried out in the flight in which the
neutral aircraft came into belligerent hands, i. e., since it left
its point of departure and before it reached its point of
destination.
ARTICLE 56. A private aircraft captured upon the ground
that it has no external marks or is using false 1narks, or that
it is armed in tilne of war outside the jurisdiction of its own
country, is liable to condemnation.
A neutral private aircraft captured upon the ground that
it has disregarded the direction of a belligerent commanding
officer under article 30 is liable to condemnation, unless it can
justify its presence within the prohibited zone.
In all other cases, the prize court in adjudicating upon any
·case of capture of an aircraft or its cargo, or of postal correspondence on board an aircraft, shall apply the sa1ne rules as
would be applied to a Inerchant vessel or its cargo or to postal
·correspondence on board a merchant vessel.
ARTICLE 58. Private aircraft 'vhich are found upon' visit
.and search to be neutral aircraft liable to condemnation upon
the ground of unneutral service, or upon the ground that
they have no external marks or are bearing false n1arks, n1ay
be destroyed, if sending then1 in for adjudication would be
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i1npossible or "~auld iinperil the sa:fety of the belligerent
aircraft or the success of the operations in 'vhich it is engaged.
Apart from the cases 1nentioned above, a neutral private aircraft 1nust not be destroyed except in the gravest 1nilitary
e1nergency, 'vhich "~auld not justify the officer in co1n1nancl
in releasing it or sending it in for adjudication.

This last article is similar to Article 49 of the
Declaratio11 of Lo11don which is as follows:
As an exception a neutral vessel captured by a belligerent
ship and "~hich would be liable to condemnation, may be
destroyed if the observance of Article 48 "~auld involve danger to the ship of "\var or to the success of the operation in
'vhich she is at the tin1e engaged.

In all these proposals for dealing 'vith aircraft .
the rules are either analogies or adaptations of analogies draw11 from the generally accepted rules of
naval and land warfare. Do these analogies hold~
Should special rights be conferred upon airplanes~
The ansvver frequently given is to the effect that
special weaknesses or special ability do not bring
special immllnities or special privileges, and that
ne'v 'veapons n1ust adapt themselves to the already
accepted rules. Some modifications, however, are
in order. Manifestly visit and search of an airplane by an airplane is quite different from a similar process on the surface. Deviation in certain
circumsta11ces must therefore be allo,ved, and in
general, the fact that airplanes operate in a three
dimensional realm, means that old regulations 1nust
take COgilizance of the new physical problems.
Prelin~inar-y Harvard draft code.-Recently, research in international law under the auspices of
the Harvard La'v School has bee11 111ade concerning rights a11d duties of neutral states in naval and
aerial war. Though the research draft is not official, the follo,ving article, No. 111, gives an indica-
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tion of the trend i11 adapting established principles
to the needs of the new agency:
( 1) A belligerent con11nissioned military aircraft 1nay
signal a merchant vessel to stop as by radio or by firing a
1nachine gun burst across its bo"~s.
(2) If sea conditions permit the aircraft to alight, the
aircraft shall alight and the procedure applicable to surface
vessels shall be follo,ved.
(3) If the belligerent aircraft is unable to alight, it 1nay
require the vessel to proceed on its course under instructions
as to speed until the sea 1noderates or until a naval vessel of
the belligerent appears; if visit and search are not effected
by either n1eans 'vithin six hours, or if the aircraft does not
retnain 'vithin sight or hearing of the merchant vessel, the
vessel may resu1ne its course at nor1nal speed.
( 4) If the vessel when summoned does not stop, attetnpts
to escape, resists visit and search, or does not proceed according to instructions, it n1ay be cotnpelled by force to stop
and the belligerent shall not be responsible for resulting
injury to life or property.

Assumptions in this case.-In arriving at the
solutions of the problems presented, it has bee11 asstlnled that the neutral plane in each case is either
a ·private plane or is to be treated as such. (See
Art. III of Habana Convention op. cit.) It is
further assumed that the papers of these planes
are in order, that the craft are plainly marked,
that it has bee11 possible to signal understandably
for visit and search, that all parties have agreed
upon the definition of contraband, that an effective blockade is being maintained, that the neutrals knew of the blockade, and that the pla11es
were all unarmed. It is therefore possible no'v to
leave the general considerations and to take tlp the
specific issues raised i11 this situation.
Vt~sit and sectrch by airplanes.-It is agreed in
principle that belligerent airplanes have the right
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to visit and search 11ot onlv neutral surface vessels
&I

but also 11eutral aircraft. Agreen1ent upo11 the
a.pplt"cation of the principle i11 actual practice is
difficult
achieve, diverge11t views having been
propounded in various quarters at different ti1nes.
At the meeti11g of the jurists at The Hague in 1923
the delegations were 11ot i11 harmony on this point
of the visit and search of surface craft. The
Dutch representatives particularly were apprehensive lest the employme11t of aircraft involve the
right of deviation. The jurists had to co11tent
the1nselves in Article 49 with the sn11ple statement
that "Private aircraft are liable to visit and search
and to capture by belligerent n1ilitary aircraft.''
The technique by which this was to be acco111plished
'vas 11ot agreed upo11. As the co1nn1ent in the proposed draft says :

to

No article on the subject of the exercise by belligerent
1nilitary aircraft of the right of visit and search of merchant vessels has secured the votes of a majority of the
Delegations, and therefore no article on the subject is included in the code of rules. Nevertheless, all the Delegations are in1pressed with the necessity of surrounding with
proper safeguards the use of aircraft against merchant
vessels. Other'"'ise excesses analogous to those which took
place during the recent war might be reproduced in future
wars.
The reason 'vhy no agreed text has been adopted by the
Commission is due to divergence of view as to what action
an aircraft should be permitted to take against a merchant
vessel.
The aircraft in use today are light and fragile things.
Except in favourable circumstances they would not be able
to alight on the water and send a man on board a merchant vessel at the spot where the merchant vessel is first
encountered ( visite sur place). To make the right of visit
and search by an aircraft effective it would usually be nee-
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essary to direct the 1nerchant vessels to con1e to some convenient locality where the aircraft can alight and send
men on board for the purpose. This would imply a right
on the part of the belligerent military aircraft to compel
the 1nerchant vessel to deviate from her course before it was
in possession of any proofs derived from an examination
of the ship herself and her papers that there were circumstances of suspicion which justified such interference with
neutral trade. If the deviation which the merchant vessel
was obliged to make was prolonged, as might be the case
•if the aircraft was operating far from land, the losses and
inconvenience imposed on · neutral shipping would be very
heavy.
Is or is not a warship entitled to oblige a merchant vessel
to deviate from her course for .the purpose of enabling the
right of visit and search to be carried out? "\Vould an aircraft be exercising its rights in confor1nity with the rules to
which surface warships are subject if it obliged a merchant
vessel to deviate from her course in this way~ Even if a
'Yarship is entitled on occasion to oblige a merchant vessel
to deviate fro1n her course before visiting her, can a si1nilar
right be recognised for military aircraft 'vithout opening
the door to very great abuses~
These are the questions upon 'vhich the views entertained
by the Delegations differed appreciably, and indicate the
reasons why it was not found possible to devise any text on
'v hich all parties could agree.

With regard to visit and search of aircraft by
aircraft, ho\vever, it was conceded by all parties,
as recorded i11 Article 50,. that the special nature
of the craft n1ade deviation imperative. Two air1)la11es simply cannot hoveT in mid-air while one
of then1 attempts to inspect the other. The laws
of gravity demand a change in the laws of nations.
Thus it is permitted to a belligerent airplane to
order the neutral cTaft to alight in or proceed to
"a suitable locality reasonably accessible'' for visit
and search. The principle of the right of deviatioi1 is thus established.
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Problen1s of s£gnalli11g and of landing.-Accord-·
ing to the general rule, the belligere11t plane 111ust
signal the neutral plane and then as}{ it to alight.
It is upon this questio11 as to the n1ethod of sigIilllliilg that international agreement is necessary.
Should the belligerent plane be expected to ma11euvre into a positio11 fron1 \vhich it ca11 fi1·e a shot
across the propeller (bow) of the neutral plane~
Son1e authorities on air matters maintain that the
pilot of a 11et1tral pla11e \Yould not be able to know
whe11 such a Rhot had been fired and that he would
be informed of the order to la11d only if tl1e shot
actually hit l1is plane. In s11ch a case, aircraft
being n1ore fragile a11d delicate than surface vessels, the dan1age committed might be out of all
proportion to the military 11eeds. For this reaso11
it is frequently suggested that sumn1ons by shot is
in1practical and unjustifiable, and that COilllllUilicatioil or suiniiions 111ust be made jn son1e other
fashion, probably by radio.
A radio sun1mo11s \vould be satisfactory if there
\Yere inter11ational agreeme11t standardizing airplane radios and airpla11e sig11als. At the present
time there is such unifor1nit~7 among surface vessels' radio equipment \vhich are tuned in frequently
to a particular \Yave lengtl1 for the reception of
distress signals. In the air, ho\vever, no belligerent plane IlO\Y could be certain that a 11eutral airplane \Vas equipped to receive a radio summons.
l\fisunderstanding a11d confusion can be eliminated
only by the acloptio11 of an international code on
this n1atter. Assuming that this difficulty has been
overcome, other problen1s arise. If the belligerent is certajn that the neutral pla11e has 1111der-
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stood ihe sum111ons and is deliberately 11ot heedi11g it, is it justified in using force to bring tl1e
11eutral plane to~ 011 the surface such a right to
the exercise of sufficie11t force to carry out a sumnlons to halt exists, but this right n1ay be exercised
'vithout necessarily destroyi11g or dan1aging
seriously the fleeing ship.
In the air, however, the frailty of the 11eutral
. plane may be such that an)r shot capable of bringing it to, might also destroy it. Son1e experts,
therefore, 'vould deny tl1e belligerent the right to
use force in this insta11ce, contending that the
safety of the passengers and personnel of the plane
ought not to be ptlt in jeopardy merely because of
a refusal to land for purposes of visit. This, however, 'vould constitute a serious restrictio11 upon
belligerent rights, a restraint "\vhich in practice indubitably -vvould be unacceptable. Provided a11_acCtlrate means for summoni11g can be agreed upon,
it does not see1n unreasonable to hold a 11et1tral
pla11e liable to the consequences of its own refusal
to heed a legitimate sun1ITIOI1s even though those
consequences be of the most seriot1s sort. If the
11eutral plane n1 such circumstances is destroyed
with complete loss of the lives and property on
board, it -vvas the fault of the net1tral "rho took the
risk, 11ot the responsibility .of the belligerent.
Other qtlestions deserve attention. Suppose the
11eutral plane is encountered over the high seas and
cannot alight upon,the.water ~ Suppose the :\Veather
is so bad that a sudde11landing 'vould be extre1nely
perilous~ Suppose the 11et1tral plane does not have
sufficient fuel to enable it to deviate and still reach
its original destination~ V\7 hat is the 1nea11ing of
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'' unreasonably accessible''~
The preliminary
Harvard draft code, previo11sly cited, attempts to
ans,ver these qtleries. Some s11ch standard conventional arrange111ent is indeed an immediate 11eed if
there is to be any satisfactory regulation of air
law. I11 all probability the belligerent \viii have to
be acco1nmodating i11 regard to supplying extra
f uel if the need occurs, and \vill have to recognize
\Yeather conditions a11cl the suitability of landing
arrangen1ents, \vith surface craft cooperating i11
the visit and search effort as suggested in the Harvard code. As to "reasonable accessibility" a radius of 50 111iles seems a feasible limit for deviation
at the present time. Future prize court interpretations of the \Vord ''reasonable'' will help to evolve
a satisfactor~y set of ruli11gs on this as ~yet undeterI11ined matter.
Attack on Chinese co1nn~ercial airplane.-One of
the first incide11ts i11volving a11 encounter bet\veen a
military and a comrnercial pla11e \Vas that which
occurred i11 August 1938 near lVIacao in China. Although technically in this case there \Vas no war
and although visit of a neutral plane was not nlvolved, the case sets an interesting precede11t. Particularly to be noted is the Japanese contention that
the commercial plane was not clearly marked .
The fact that military and commercial aircraft ordinarily are 11ot easily distinguishable is an important one for internatio11al la\v. If confusion
is to be avoided, agreement must be reached tlpOil
the proper marl{ing of nonmilitary pla11es. Otherwise "regrettable incide11ts" will continue to occur.
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Text of a note presented to the J apa11ese Foreign
Office by the .American An1bassador at Tokyo, tlpon
instrt1ctioi1 of the Secretary of State:
AuGUST

26, 1938.

ExcELLENCY :

Acting under instructions, I ha Ye the honor on. behalf of
n1y Government to protest to Your Excellency against the
un"·arranted attack on August 24, 1938, near Macao, by
Japanese airplanes upon a co1nn1ercial airplane operated by
the China National Aviation Corporation resulting in the
total destruction of the commercial airplane, the loss of the
1ives of a number of noncombatant passengers, and the endangering of the life of the A1nerican pilot.
This attack upon the plane has aroused public feeling in
the United States.
I am directed to point out to Your Excellency, ·with reference to the attack in question, that not only was the life of
an A1nerican national directly imperilled but loss was also
occasioned to American property interests as the Pan American Air,vays has a very substantial interest in the China
National Aviation Corporation.
I an1 directed to invite the special attention of Your
Excellency to the following points in the account of Pilot
Wood: the China National Aviation Corporation plane was
pursued by Japanese planes 'vhich started n1achine .g unning; after the China National Aviation Corporation plane
had successfully landed it "·as follow·ed do,vn by Japanese
pursuit planes which continued to machine gun it until it
had sunk; and when Pilot Wood started s'vimming across
the river he was followed by one of the Japanese planes
which continued to machine gun him.
My Government desires to express its en1phatic obje~tion
to the jeopardizing in this way ~f the lives of American as
w·ell as other noncombatant occupants of unarmed civilian
planes engaged in clearly recognized and established comInercial services over a regularly scheduled air route.
I avail myself (etc.)
JosEPH C. GRE,v.
(Press Releases, Vol. XIX, No. 465, pp. 146-147.)
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Follo\Ying is the text of the J apa11ese 11ote,
handed to Unit eel States A1nbassador Joseph C.
Gre\v tonight, replying to tl1e An1erica11 protest of
August .26 against the destructio11 of a Chi11eseAn1erican airliner 11ear Canto11 Allgust 24 (Tol(yo,
Aug. 31):
)!OXSIE"GR L' ..:\.. ~IBASSADE"CR:

I have the honor to acknowledge Your Excellency's note
of . A. ugust 26 stating Your Excellency's protest under instructions and on behalf of the .A..1nerican Government
against an lllnYarranted attack August 24 near Jiacao by
,Japanese airplanes upon a com1nercial airplane of the
China X ational Aviation Corporation resulting in the
tob1l destruction of said Chinese plane and the loss of the
Jives of a ntunber of its passengers and endangering the life
of its A1nerican pilot.
The incident "~as caused by the C. N . . ...\... C. plane which,
''ithin the Japanese field of operations, acted in such a
manner as invited suspicions of its being a Chinese military
craft, as stated in the follo,-ving report, and 'vhich was
consequently pursued and attacked by our naval planes in
the belief that it ''as an enemy plane.
7
' ' hile it is to be regretted that this resulted in endangering the life of an American citizen "~ho happened to be
the pilot of the plane, as well as the death or wounding
of nonco1nbatant passengers and crew, the Japanese Governnlent. hold the vie'' that the action of their naval planes
''US not lnnvarranted in the light of the aboYe-Jnentionecl
circu1nstance.
It is also their opinion that the con1pany to which the
aircraft in question belonged being a Chinese juridical
person. the incident is not one 'vhich involves tT a pan directly
"~ith any third po"~er.
Ho,vever, I desire to add that because of the 'vide discrepancies bet"·een the pilot's accounts~ as given in Your
Excellency's note, and reports in the hands of the Japanese
Govennnent, further investigations ''ere instituted and the
follo"~ing ne'v report has been received, which substantially
confirn1s "·hat )lr. Horinouchi C'Tice )linister for Foreign
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Affairs) on the occasion of Your Excellency's visit on the
26th stated on the basis of infor1nation then available.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency assurances of my highest consideration.
REPORT

On the 1norning of the 24th instant five Japanese naval
airplanes, proceeding in the direction of the Canton-Hanko'' raihvay, unexpectedly sighted over Chiautao Island,
at 9: 30 a. n1., a large-type land plane, bearing no distinguishing 1nark, some 2,000 meters away to the north, 'vhich
'Yas flying tow·ard the west at an altitude of about 2,000
meters, and attempted to approach the plane for the purpose· of identification.
1.'he large plane in question, as soon as it discovered our
naval planes approaching, abruptly turned in a north,ve~t
erly direction and took flight at full speed, hiding itself in
the clouds. The approaching 1novement of the naval planes
'vere made for the purpose of ascertaining the nature of
the lund plane.
Ho,vever, seeing the plane flee from the1n, our air squadron concluded in the light of their past experiences that it
"·as an enen1y plane w·hich caine either to attack our "·arships or to make reconnaisance and accordingly took an offensive position by placing t"·o planes above and three
planes belo""" the clouds. Soon after, our planes lying in
w·ait belo"· the clouds, discovering the supposedly ene1ny
plane, pursued and attacked it.
'fhe plane continued to flee by taking advantage of scattered clouds, but was hard pressed by our squadron and
finally landed in the river on the south side of the delta
'vhich lies sixteen kilon1eters 'vest of Hungmenchiko·w.
From the ti1ne they first sighted the plane until the n1o1nent
it landed our planes 'vere situated directly behind it for
most of the tiine, so that it was difficult to ascertain its
character, and our planes were throughout in the belief that
the land plane was an enemy craft.
As soon as the latter landed, ho"·ever, our planes descended in order to inspect the spot. ..\"Vhen they reached a
point above the land plane "~here they could better distinguish the type of plane, a doubt arose as to its exact type.
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Our planes therefore im1nediately stopped their attack. As
stated above, there 'vas some ti1ne, though very brief, after
the landing of the saia plane until doubt caine to be entertained as to its nature, and during that brief period there
'Yere so1ne among our craft w·hich continued the attack,
but there 'vas absolutely no n1ore shooting thereafter.
Our naval planes then dived to t'venty 1neters above the
"~ater and inspected the landed plane, whereupon the plane
in question "~us found to be an all-metal Douglas passenger
plane 'vith no painted n1ark except a Chinese character signifying "mail" marked on the upper :face o:f its right wing
and on the right side o:f its body. Our planes left 'vithout
firing. Our planes sa'v on the landed plane the pilot and
also a :fe,v passengers near the entrance o:f the passenger
con1partment in the rear, but they thought as the spot was
close to the bank o:f the river these men "~ould reach the
shore (Press Releases, Vol. XIX, No. 466, pp. 156-158.)

Set~d·ing

in to a prize court.-If, in the present

case, visit and search of the neutral planes yields
evidence of guilt, the craft should be sent i11 for
prize court adjudication. It 111ust be reme111bered
that search is not a11 i11quisition, that there must be
legal grounds for holding the plane, that 1nere
suspicion is not enough, and that visit and search
are an enqt1iry, not a prosecutio11.
,.Vhereas, according to the principles universally ackno,vledged, a belligerent ship o:f war has, as a general rule and
except for special circuinstances, the right to stop in the open
sea a neutral co1nmercial vessel and to proceed to visit and
search it to assure himself "~hether it is observing the rules
of neutrality, especially as to contraband;
'Vhereas, on the other hand, as the legality of every act
going beyond the limits o:f visit and search depends upon
the existence either o:f contraband trade or o:f sufficient reasons to believe that there is such,
as, in this respect, it is necessary to confine oneself to reason8 of a juridical nature; * * *
as the inforn1ation possessed by the Italian authorities \nts
of too general a nature and had too little connection "~ith
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the aeroplane in question to constitute sufficient juridical
reasons to believe in any hostile destination whatever and,
consequently, to justify the capture of the vessel which was
transporting the aeroplane. (The Carthage, G. G. Wilson,
The Hague Arbitration Cases, p. 365.)

Airplanes a1td contraband.-The Jurists' Code
envisages the seizure of neutral pla11es on the
ground of carrying contraband (Art. 53, Sec. i).
Undoubtedly in any future war belligerents will
attempt to intercept contraband comn1erce by air
ag they have by sea, though special schemes for certification of neutral airships lil{e one outlined in
the preliminary Harvard Code may go into effect
.a nd so obviate the usual contraband rules. The
problem of what constitutes ·c ontraband is not one
that needs to be resolved here. Possibly every article will be contraband, or perhaps the concept
will disappear entirely with neutrals and belliger·e nts agreeing instead upon some sort of certificate
system. In this instance, if the B-17 were intercepted while actually carrying contraband, the
plane would be liable to seizure. The air code is
thus more severe than the surface law rules, for
according to the jurists' plan, the vessel is liable
merely for the carriage of contraband while surface merchant ships are not similarly liable unless
some connection between the ownership of the vessel and that of the goods can be established. That
is, if the ship's owners can b~ presumed to know
that the ship is carrying contraband, the ship n1ay
then be seized. .According to the Declaration of
London presun1ption of such knowledge exists if(ARTICLE 40). * * * The contraband forms, either by
·value, by "\veight, by volume, or by freight, more than half
the cargo.
167533-40-3
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The penalty for the carriage of contraband, however, terminates \vith the deposit of the goods. As
the Jt1rist's Code states in Article 53:
The ground for capture shall be an act carried out in the
flight in " '" hich the neutral aircraft can1e into belligerent
hands, i. e., since it left its point of depa-r'Cure and before it
reached its point of destination.

The rule is the san1e for surface ships.
A capture is not to be made on the ground of a carriage of
contraband previously accomplished and at the time completed. (Declaration of London, Art. 38.)
A vessel's liability to seizure for the carriage of contraband usually terminates 'vith the deposit of the contraband
cargo, unless the voyage has been acco1nplished by 1neans of
false or simulated papers. (Evans, Cases on International
La,v, pp. 700, 701 ff.)

Si11ce the B-17 is encountered "later," that is,
presumably after it has completed the carriage of
the contraband, it should be released by the Y -2,
'vhich should make a record of the visit and search
in the B-17's log.
Should the air la~v be '11tore rigor·otts P-The suggestion has been made that the application of the
Tegular maritime rules by analogy to the aiT is
unsatisfactory. The argument runs that since an
airplane travels so much faster than a surface ship,
a11d since it is capable of making so many more
voyages, the pe11alty should be more severe. The
greater effectiveness of the plane for the carriage
of goods should make for an extension of the liability, according to this view. Also, it is said that
because of the greater difficulty of intercepting aircraft, the penalty when they are caught should be
correspondingly more stringent. The la\v in the
future may move in this direction, but to date it
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has not, and the solution must be reached on the
basis of the established practice in maritime cases.
Airpla1~es a1~d blockade.-There has not yet been
in practice any attempt to maintain a blockade by
airplanes but all discus.sions on the laws of warfare assume that such a blockade may some day
be tried. The jurists in 1923 in Article 53 assumed
such a contingency and gave a belligerent the right
to seize on the grounds of violation of blockade.
Students of the proble111 are in accord on the point
t:hat a blockade maintained by airplanes alone
would be neither feasible nor possible. It is always in conjunction with surface vessel that an
air blockade is considered. It is foreseen, however, that due to the three-dimensional activity of
the airplane some change in the type of blockade
may well come about, and that instead of a blockade being thought of in terms of a "line" it will
be conceived of as more of a zone. Because of the
ease with which planes might get around the conventional blockade, an increase in the belligerent's
blockade radius may well be expected. In some
recent discussions of the problem, it was agreed
tentatively that a blockade might extend as a zone
for 50 miles to sea from the enemy coastline.
Suggestions are not lacking that the concept of
an air blockade is erroneous, and that it would be
better to discard entirely blockade terminology
from air law discussions, substitt1ting instead the
phrase "barred zone." Witliin such an area all
travel by neutral or belligerent aircraft might be
prohibited upon penalty of being fired upon. Visit
and search as an institution would not be present
in such a zone. Something analogous to the situation contemplated in Article 30 of the Jurists'
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Code may prove n1ore feasible for the air than the
classic blockade.
In case the belligerent co1nmanding officer considers that
the presence of aircraft is likely to prejudice the success of
the operation in 'vhich he is engaged at the moment, he may
prohibit the passing of neutral aircraft in the immediate
vicinity of his forces, or may oblige them to follow a particular route. A neutral aircraft 'vhich does not conform to
such directions, of 'vhich he has had notice issued by the
belligerent co1n1nanding officer, may be fired upon.

The subject of aircraft a11d blocl{ade was
thoroughly discussed in the Naval War College In-ternational La\v Situation in 1935.
A blockade maintained by surface vessels only without
means of preventing or rendering dangerous the passage of
aircraft or snb1narines 'vould he a "paper blockade" insofar
as such craft w·ere concerned even though proclaimed to inelude these. Any seaplane 1net at sea by a vessel of war may
be visited and searched to detern1ine its relation to the hostilities, and it may be treated according to the evidence found.
In recent years, on account of i1nproved means of communication, it 'vould be difficult to prove ignorance.

Professor J. M. Spaight in his Air Power and
War Rights, Second Edition, p. 394 et seq., explores the problems of air blockade very thoroughly, and suggests that "a differe11t degree of effectiveness will probably be de111anded in the air, bec~use of the greater difficulty of controlling passage in that element."
Pe1~alty for breach of blockade.-Assuming in
this situatio11, l1o\vever, that an effective blocl{ade
i11 the air is being mai11tained, it is important to
decide just \vhen the C-12 was encountered by the
Y -2. If the C-12 is 011 the outward lap of the
voyage to the blockaded port, it is liable for breach
of blocl{ade.
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A vessel 'vhich in violation of blockade has left a blockaded
port or has attempted to enter the port, is liable to capture
so long as she is pursued by a ship of th8 blockading force.
(Declaration of London, Art. 20.)
If a vessel has succeeded in escaping from a blockaded port,
liability to capture continues, according to .L-\..merican opinion,
until the completion of the voyage; but with the termination
of the voyage, the offense ends. (Naval ·Instructions Governing Maritime 1'Varfare, June 30, 1917, No. 31.)

Therefore, if the Y -2 is a part of the blockading
force, and meets the C-12 while the latter is proceeding from the port of 0, the C-12 may be seized.
Ho"\vever, if the latter has completed the round trip,
liability has ceased and the C-12 should be released.
According to the traditional Anglo-An1erican opinion as explained by C. C. Hyde, International Law,
Vol. II, Page 682, the C-12 is still liable on the return voyage when met by the Y -2 even if the latter
is not a member of the blockading squadron.
Further CommenJ on Blockade.No ter1n in the whole range of maritime law has been the
subject of greater abuse than that of blockade; and, as it 'vas
not contended that aircraft could in their present stage of
development maintain a blockade in the same sense that surface ships can do, there was evident reason to apprehend that
the anticipatory application to their activities of the term
blockade would inject into the la'v an additional element of
uncertainty and confusion capable of vast extension. Under
the other provisions of the rule a considerable measure of
power is conceded to belligerents in regard to the control of
the movements of aircraft in the neighborhood of their military operations or military forces, this measure of control
would evidently be helpful to a surface force maintaining a
blockade, and to a land force n1aintaining a siege. 1'Vhether
it is desirable to go further is a question for mature consideration. (John Bassett 1\foore, International Law & Some
Current Illusions & Other Essays, 1924, p. 207.)
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"Blockade" is here used in the same sense in which it is
en1ployed in Chapter 1 of the Declaration of London, that
is to say, an operation of war for the purpose of preventing
by ,the use of warships ingress or egress of commerce to or
from a defined portion of the enemy's coast. It has no
reference to a blockade enforced without the use of warships,
nor does it cover military investments of particular localities on land. These operations, which may be termed
"aerial blockade," were the subject of special examination
by the experts attached to the various Delegations, who
framed a special report on the subject for consideration by
the Full Commission. The conditions contemplated in this
sub-head are those of warships enforcing a blockade at
sea with aircraft acting in co-operatioi1 with them. As the
primary elements of the blockade will, therefore, be maritime, the recognised principles applicable to such blockade,
as for instance, that it must be effective (Declaration of
Paris, Art. 4), and that it must be duly notified and its
precise liinits fixed, will also apply. This is intended to be
sho,vn by the use of the words "breach of blockade duly
established and effectively maintained" in the text of the
sub-head.
It is too early yet to indicate with precision the extent
to which the co-operation of aircraft in the maintenance of
blockade at sea n1ay be possible; experience alone can sho,v.
N eYertheless, it is necessary to indicate the sense in which
the Commission has used the word "effective." As pointed
out in the Declaration of London, the effectiveness of a
blockade is a question of fact. The word "effective" is intended to ensure that it must be maintained by a force
sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy coast-line.
The prize court may, for instance, have to consider what
proportion of surface vessels can escape the watchfulness
of the blockading squadro'ns w·ithout endangering the ~ffec
tiveness of the blockade; this is a question 'vhich the prize
court alone can determine. In the san1e "~ay, this question
may have to be considered 'vhere aircraft are co-operating
in the n1aintenance of a blockade.
The invention of the aircraft cannot iinpose upon a belligerent 'vho desires to institute a blockade the obligation to
e1nploy aircraft in co-operation 'Yith his naval forces. If
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he does not do so, the effectiveness of the blockade would
not be affected by failure to stop aircraft passing through.
It is only where the belligerent endeavours to render his
blockade effective in the air-space above the sea as well as
on the surface itself that captures of aircraft will be made
and that any question of the effectiveness of the blockade
in the air could arise.
The facility with which an aircraft, desirous of entering
the blockaded area, could evade the blockade by passing outside the geographical limits of the blockade has not escaped
the attention of the Commission. This practical question
may affect the extent to which belligerents will resort to
blockade in future, but it does not affect the fact that where
a blockade has been established and an aircraft attempt to
pass through into the blockaded area within the limits of
the blockade, it should be liable to capture.
The Netherlands Delegation proposed to suppress (i) on
the grounds that air blockade could not be effectively maintained, basing its opinion on its interpretation of the experts' report on the subject.
The British, French, Italian and Japanese Delegations
voted for its maintenance. The American Delegation voted
for its maintenance ad referendum. (Jurists' Report, 1923,
Comment upon Art. 53, Sec. i.)

Visit and search and air mail.-An airplane carrying mail is not immune from visit and search.
According to Hague Convention XI, Relating to
the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War
"the inviolability of postal correspondence does
not exempt a neutral mail ship from the laws and
customs of maritime war as to neutral merchant
ships in general'' (Art. 2). There is no legal reason, therefore, why the Y -2 may not order the
D-20 to alight for visit and search. Though mail
ships are not immune from belligerent visit and
search, private correspondence on board is supposed to be inviolable (Hague Convention XI, Art.
1). The World War experience demonstrated,
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however, that this inviolability-is exceedingly uncertaii1, the result of the concessions 1nade by the
United States bei11g in substance that private mail
n1ay be opened in oTder that the belligerent may
detern1ine whether it is inviolable Ol" not. The
Allied co11tention during the war was that the mail
privileges \Yere being abused by private persons
who inserted contTaband articles into their correspo11dence. The \Vhole subject of mails was
thoroughly revie,ved and studied in Situation II,
of the Inter11ational Law Situations in 1928.
The situation when a seacraft endeavors to visit and search
an aircraft is one involving exceptional dangers to the aircraft. Mere suspicion does not justify the subjection of aircraft to undue risk. C'raft carrying n1ails should not be unnecessarily delayed. The mail carrier does not know what
are the contents of the mail pouches and i~ not directly concerned 'vith these contents. Guilt cannot be presumed. Destruction on ground of any act prior to the summons cannot
easily be justified. (Naval War College Situations, 1928, pp.
70-71.)

The D-20 even though it may be a state-owned
craft, ca1111ot be regarded by the Y -.2 as a military
plane. In these days of increasing governmental
o'vnership, \Yith gover11me11ts engaged in all kinds
of ne'Y activities, the la\v still treats the vessels
a11d planes O\vned by governn1ents and performing
non-n1ilitary functions as private craft. e. g. The
Habana Convention, 1928, Art. 3, op. cit.) The
D-20 may 11ot be shot do\vn as a n1ilitary plane.
In conducting visit and search the Y -2 must follow
the traditional rules applicable to merchant vessels.
(Jurists' Report, Art. 56, Par. 3.)
Inas1nuch as the n1ilitary messages, funds, and
n1ilitary materials were carried in the regular airmail, the D-20 was not guilty of unneutral service.
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It was not engaged in a special voyage, nor was it
under special charter to a belligerent state. As
previously remarked, a craft carrying contraband
even though caught in delicto is not liable unless
its ovvners or operators could be presumed to know
the nature of the cargo. The articles here were
transported in the normal postal pouches, so that
the D-20 pilot or owner presumably had no knowledge of their contents. It is doubtful whether the
articles here can be considered as contraband anyway because they were probably belligerent owned
emanating as they did from a belligerent port. In
any case, the D-20 is guilty neither of unneutral
service nor of carriage of contraband. The fact
that mere carriage of th8 mails in regular pouches
is not unneutral service is well explained in Spaight.
op. cit. page 392 and Oppenheim, I11ternational
Law, 1935, Vol. II, page 699. Furthermore, the
liabili(y· for carrying contraband and for unneutral service does not extend beyond the end of the
voyage in which the craft vvas engaged in such an
enterprise. The D-20 probably having con1pleted
the voyage, is no longer subject to penalty. Possibly, if it were encountered while flying over tl1e
blockade line, or on a voyage on which it had
broken the blockade, it could be seized as a blockade runner, btlt the facts in this case scarcely
warrant such a conclusion.
Contraband and continuo~ts voyage.-The issue
raised in the case of the E-30 is obviously one of
''continuous voyage.'' This is really a part of the
subject of contraband, for "continuous voyage"
relates to the carriage of contraband articles by an
indirect route. In contraband there are two elements, destination and the nature of the goods.
I
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There n1ust be an enemy destination and the goods
1nust be neutral o\vned and of a nature useful for
, \Yar. '' Conti11uous voyage'' involves the destination ele1nent in contraband, the belligerent in such
1natters clain1ing that the goods, though directed
initially to neutral ports, are actually designed for
trans-shipment or a continuation of the journey to
belligerent hands. The doctrine first became important \Vhen neutrals attempted to circumvent the
British Rule of 1756, according to wl1ich commerce
bet\veei1 the Inother country and the colonies, closed
in peace time to third states, could not be opened
to neutral ships in tin1e of war. Triangular trade,
sucl1 as that bet\veen the West Indies, an American
port, and France, in which American (neutral)
ships \Vere engaged in carrying articles indirectly
around t\vo legs of a journey instead of directly bet\veen the "Test Indies and France, \vas intercepted
and conden1ned by the British on the grounds that
the trade really constituted one ''continuous voyage." (The \i\Tillian1, 1806, VI C. Robinson, 316.)
This doctrine was transferred to contraband and
blockade during the American Civil War and was
greatly extended during the last \Var when it really
becan1e a doctrine of llltimate destination and of
substitution. The British prize courts condemned
cargoes \Vhen there \vas no direct evidence that the
goods \Vere actually going to Ger111any and, instead,
en1ployed presumptions based upon statistics and
obscure evide11ce. (The I<:in1, L. R., 1915, p. 215;
the Baron Stjernblad, L. R. 1918, A. C. 173; The
Bonna, L. R. 1918, p. 123.) In the last named of
these, the doctrine of substitution made an appearance in the court's suggestion that even though the
cocoanut oil on board did not actually go through
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Sweden to Germany it might enable the Swedes
to release a certain amount of margarine and butter
from their ''reservoir of fats'' to Germany.
The subject of "continuous voyage" has been
thoroughly treated in previous Naval War College
Situations and material in this subject will be found
in the volumes issued in 1922 and 1926. In the
case of the E-30 the contraband cargo has evidently been deposited, so that the aircraft is no
longer liable, the rules and argumentation being
the same as those discussed in Section (a) for the
B-17.

Aircraft a1td ~tnne~ttral serv·i ce.-The international law rules in regarq to unneutral service
for merchant ships have been carried over into the
law dealing with aircraft. This was recognized in
Article 53, Section (c) of the Jurist's report 'vhich
stated that "A neutral private aircraft is liable to
capture if it * * * is e11gaged in unneutral
service.'' Other drafts and plans for air law in
wartime have also assumed that unneutral service
would be a part of the air rules. Therefore, those
acts which constitute un11eutral service on the part
of surface ships 'vill also be unneutral service in
the air. Maritime and air regulations 'vill thus
coincide, there being no reason 'vhy the different
character of aircraft should create the necessity
for genuinely new regulations or serious modifications in the old.
ART. 45. A neutral vessel is liable to be condemned and in
a general way, is liable to the same treatment which a neutral vessel would undergo when liable to condemnation on
account of contraband of war.
(1) If she is making a voyage specially with a vie'v to the
transport of individual passengers who are embodied in the
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ar1ned force of the enemy, or 'vith a vie\V to the transmission
of information in the interest of the enemy.
(2.) If, 'vith the knowledge of the o'vner, of the one who
' charters the vessel entire, or of the n1aster, she is transporting
a 1nilitary detaclnnent of the ene1ny, or one or more persons
'rho, during the yoyage, lend direct assistance to the operations of the enemy. In the cases specified in the preceding
paragraphs (1) and (2), goods belonging to the owner of the
vessel are like,Yise liable to condemnation.
The provisions of the present Article do not apply if when
the vessel is encountered at sea she is una,vare of the opening
of the hostilities, or if the master, after becoming aware of
the opening of hostilities, has not been able to disembark the
passengers. The vessel is deemed to know of the state of 'var
if she left an enemy port after the opening of hostilities, or a
neutral port after there had been made in sufficient time a
notification of the opening of hostilities to the Power to 'vhich
such port belongs.
·
'
AnT. 46. A neutral vessel is liable to be condemned and, in
a general "'~'ay, is liable to the same treatinent 'vhich she 'vould
undergo if she 'vere a 1nerchant-vessel of the enemy:
( 1) If she takes a direct part in the hostilities.
(2) If she is under the orders or under the control of an
agent placed 011 board by the ene1ny Government.
(3) If she is chartered entirely by the enemy Govern1nent.
( 4) If she is at the ti1ne and exclusively either devoted to
the transport of ene1ny troops or to the transmission of infornlation in the interest of the enemy.
In the cases specified in the present Article, the goods belonging to the o'vner of the vessel are like,vise liable to
condmnnation.
AnT. 47. Any individual embodied in the armed force of
the enmny and 'vho is found on board a neutral merchantvessel, may be made a prisoner of 'var, even though there be no
ground for the capture of the vessel. (Declaration of London, 1909.)

U nneutral service has been discussed previously
in Naval War College Situations, the 1928 volume
dealing carefully with this subject. In the resume
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that year, page 106, is found the following
conclusion :
'Vhile there has been a tendency to extend the scope of unneutral service, it is evident from practice., instructions, decisions, etc., that the principles of the Declaration of London
of 1909 were general1y accepted at the beginning of the World
War in 1914. vVhere extreme action "\Vas taken during the
World War on the ground of reprisals such action followed
no precedent based on general practice.

The essence of unneutral service, or rather
its chief ingredient, consists in the undertaking
specially to perform some service for a belligerent.
By engaging in such special undertakings, the neutral ship or plane divests itself of its normal commercial character and :performs a military job.
Unneutral service is thus distinguishable from
contraband because in the latter the neutral ship
is engaged in con1n1ercial enterprise, while in the
former it is participating directly in a belligerent's affairs. Where an airplane like the G-40 is
carrying a belligerent general under a special charter it is clearly engaged in unneutral service for
which the penalty is the seizure of the plane. If
the general took passage on a regular commercial
flight, and if the ship and its owners did not go out
of their way to accommodate the general, there
would be no liability. For a clear analysis of air
law i11 regard to unneutral service see Spaight, op.
cit., page 390 et. seq.
Period of liability for t(;1t1teutral serv·ice by aircraft.-In the present case of the G-40 if that
plane has completed the round trip journey from
the port in state G to the military headquarters of
state X, its liability is at an end provided, as above
i11dicated, the usual maritime law is made applica-
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ble in toto to the air. In regard to penalty, however, there is some indication that for aircraft,
liability is not discharged \vhen the special service
is terminated. In Article 6 of the Jurists' code
it is stipulated that where a neutral vessel or aircraft transmits infor111ation to a belligerent concerning military operations, "liability to capture
* * * is not extinguished by the conclusion of
the voyage or flight on \vhich the vessel or aircraft
was engaged at the time, but shall subsist for a
period of one year after the act complained of.''
Thus the air rules regarding penalty for unneutral service may become more stringent in the future. The fact that an airplane can deviate
11owadays so easily and is relatively so mobile and
swift that it can perform special services more
frequently and expeditiously than can surface vessels i11dicates that for air law the period of liability
will probably be longer than it has been for
maritime law.
Resume.-Although at the present time there are
no binding rules of international law in regard
to the conduct of hostilities in the air, and in regard to neutral and belligerent rights in the air,
it is apparent that most of the conceptions and
many of the rules of maritime law \viii be carried over into the rules for the air. The traditional
rights of visit and search and of seizure on the
grounds of contraband, blockade, and unneutraJ
service \viii belong to belligerents in future con.&
flicts. International agreeme11t on the application
of these rights is desperately needed. Because of
the difficulties i11volved i11 carrying out visit and
search, difficulties inl1erent in the nature of aircraft, future belligerents 111ay be tempted to dis-
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pense e11tirely with restraints and to shoot down
neutral and enemy craft more or less indiscriminately. For the avoidance of such an unfortunate state of affairs, it is imperative that practical
rules be devised.
The technique of visit and search in the air must
be evolved with proper regard for the nature of
aircraft. Unlike merchant vessels, aircraft must
deviate in order to undergo visit and search, and
agreement must be arrived at on such matters as
proper landing places, weather conditions, and fuel
supplies. It is essential, too, that nations make a
convention on the method of signalling a neutral
plane, it being probable that the traditional shot
''across the bo'v'' will not be feasible, and it being
necessary further to establish uniformity in airplane radio sets, equipment for receiving, etc.
The air may bring modifications in the customary
la,vs and rules relating to contraba11d and blockade. The high speeds of planes and the ease with
which they can cross a line of blockade, may cause
belligerents and neutrals to agree upon some sort of
certificate scheme in the place of the conventional
visit and search for contraband, and upon a ''barred
zone'' in lieu of the old-time maritime blockade.
Tentative agreements upon some of these matters,
particularly those relating to the methods of signalling for visit and search, shollld be sought immediately, though the experience of future conflicts, if and when they come, 'viii play a leading
role in the development of the law.
As for the penalties involved in carriage of contraband, breach of blockade, and u11neutral service, a tendency to,vards a greater severity is distinctly discernible. Facilities possessed by aircraft

40

RIGHTS IN REGARD TO AIRCRAFT

for eluding capture and for - making frequent
trips, 1nake it 11ot unreasonable for the law to extend the period of liability beyond that customarily
' possessed by surface vessels. Planes may not,
therefore, expect imn1unity when they have deposited contraband or terminated their act of
unneutral service.
For the present, given the absence of formulated
rules, the solution to air problems must be sought
to a great extent upon the basis of analogy to
maritime law, with distinct modifications, however, where these are called for by reason of the
nature of aircraft. Althot1gh it has not been customary i11 inter11ational law to co11cede favors or
privileges to new weapons because they possessed
special handicaps or weaknesses, the laws of
physics, that is, the fact that airplanes move in a
three-dimensional realm and cannot stand still in
the air, force modifications in the rllles, not as a
matter of special privilege, but as a n1atter of absolute necessity. This does not mean, therefore, that
belligerent aircraft can claim freedom from legal
restrictions merely because it is difficult to conform
to formerly accepted principles. It does mean that
the legal restraints 111ust be adapted to the peculiar
needs of the air. Nor may neutral craft claim special privileges merely because airplanes are rela,
tively frail, and because the exercise of belligerent
force might endanger the whole craft. An adjustment of risks and restraints can be made upon the
basis of established principles with neutrals accepting interference with their air commerce and
belligerents abandoning any pretentious to ruthlessness and arbitrary actions. The great belligerent-neutral compromises on visit and search,
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contraband, blockade and unneutral service may
be continued with necessary changes occasioned by
the nature of the medium involved.
SOLUTION

In each instance the Y -2 may lawfully visit and
search the neutral aircraft.
(a) The B-17 should be released.
(b) If the Y -2 is a member of the blockading
squadron and if it meets the C-12 while the latter
is engaged on the return voyage, the C-12 should
be seized and held for prize court adjudication. If
the Y -2 encounters the C-12 after the latter bas
completed the round trip journey, the C-12 should
be released. If the Y -2 is not a member of the
blockading squadron but meets the C-12 while the
latter is 011 the return trip, the 0-12 may be seized
and held for prize court adjudication.
(c) The D-20 should be released.
(d) The E-30 should be released.
(e) If the G-40 is no longer under special charter, and if it has completed the journey for which
it 'vas hired, it should be released.
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